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A MEAN-FIELD GAME APPROACH TO PRICE
FORMATION IN ELECTRICITY MARKETS
DIOGO A. GOMES AND JOA˜O SAU´DE
Abstract. Here, we introduce a price-formation model where a
large number of small players can store and trade electricity. Our
model is a constrained mean-field game (MFG) where the price is a
Lagrange multiplier for the supply vs. demand balance condition.
We establish the existence of a unique solution using a fixed-point
argument. In particular, we show that the price is well-defined and
it is a Lipschitz function of time. Then, we study linear-quadratic
models that can be solved explicitly and compare our model with
real data.
1. Introduction
The mean-field game (MFG) framework [16, 17, 22, 23] models sys-
tems with many rational players (see, e.g., the surveys [13] and [14]).
Here, we are interested in the price formation in electricity markets.
In our model, a large number of agents owns storage devices that can
be charged and later supply the grid with electricity. Agents seek to
maximize profit by trading electricity at a price $(t), which is set by
a supply versus demand balance condition.
With the advent of electric cars, a large number of network-connected
batteries are already available, and their number is only likely to in-
crease. Moreover, energy can be stored as heat or cold, using space or
water heaters and air-conditioning units [19, 20, 18]. With new small
network-capable devices, appliances can be connected to the grid and
use smart algorithms to control their energy usage. These algorithms
can balance supply and demand and, thus, are particularly relevant
when combined with solar and wind energy production, where power
demand seldom matches production.
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2 DIOGO A. GOMES AND JOA˜O SAU´DE
Price formation models were some of the first MFG models [24]. This
line of research was pursued by several authors, see [5, 4, 28, 2, 3, 21, 11]
and the monograph [12]. Some of these models are formulated as free
boundary problems [5, 4]; others as a load control problem [27, 26]. For
example, using mean-field control and MFG, the load-control problem
through switching on and off space heaters was studied in [19, 20,
18]. Previous authors addressed the price issue by assuming that the
demand is a given function of the price [15] or that the price is a
given function of the demand, see [8], [7], and [9]. In particular, in
these references, the authors use a price function to study mean-field
equilibrium in electricity markets in a setting that is similar to ours.
Here, we pursue a different approach: often, in economic models,
prices of goods and services are determined by the balance between sup-
ply and demand rather than by a given function of the supply. There-
fore, the price as a function of the supply or demand is not known a
priori and a key unknown in the problem. This observation motivated
the approach in [11], where price arises from supply versus demand
constraints. However, that model is more complex than the one dis-
cussed here and was only studied from a numerical perspective. Thus,
mathematical issues such as the existence and uniqueness of a price, the
well-posedness of the model, and the convergence of numerical methods
were left unanswered and are settled here.
Our model comprises three quantities of interest: a price$ ∈ C([0, T ]),
a value function u ∈ C(R× [0, T ]), and a path describing the statisti-
cal distribution of the agents, m ∈ C([0, T ],P), where P is the set of
probability measures in R with bounded first moment, endowed with
the 1-Wasserstein distance. These quantities are determined by the
following problem.
Problem 1. Given  ≥ 0, a Hamiltonian, H : R × R → R, H ∈ C∞,
an energy production rate Q : [0, T ] → R, Q ∈ C∞([0, T ]), a terminal
cost u¯ : R → R, u¯ ∈ C∞(R) and an initial probability distribution
m¯ ∈ P ∩ C∞c (R), find u : R × [0, T ] → R, m ∈ C([0, T ],P), and
$ : [0, T ]→ R solving
(1)

−ut +H(x,$(t) + ux) = uxx
mt − (DpH(x,$(t) + ux)m)x = mxx∫
Ω
DpH(x,$(t) + ux)dm = −Q(t),
and satisfying the initial-terminal conditions
(2)
{
u(x, T ) = u¯(x),
m(x, 0) = m¯(x).
3In the previous problem, x ∈ R represents the state of a typical agent;
that is, the energy stored by the agent. The function u(x, t) is the value
function for an agent whose charge is x at time t. The Hamiltonian,
H : R × R → R is determined by the optimization problem that each
agent seeks to solve, as described in Section 2. We require u to be
a viscosity of the first equation in (1). However, if  > 0, parabolic
regularity theory gives additional regularity for u. For each t ∈ [0, T ],
m determines the distribution of the energy storage of the agents. Here,
we assume that m is a weak solution of the second equation in (1); that
is, for every ψ ∈ C2c (R× [0, T ]), we have∫ T
0
∫
R
(ψt + ψxDpH(x,$ + ux)− ψxx)mdxdt
=
∫
R
ψ(x, T )m(x, T )dx−
∫
R
ψ(x, 0)m¯(x)dx.
The parameter  corresponds to random fluctuation in the storage of
the agents. Finally, the spot price, $(t), is selected so that the total
energy used balances the supply, Q(t), the condition imposed by the
last equation in (1).
In the current model, agents have a time horizon T > 0, and, at
time T , they incur in the terminal cost u¯(x) that depends on their
state at the terminal time. For example, agents may prefer to have
the batteries fully charged at the end of the day. Moreover, the initial
distribution of agents, m¯, is known. These two facts are encoded in
the initial-terminal boundary conditions, (2). This model can easily
be modified to address periodic in time boundary conditions and the
infinite horizon discounted problem.
First, in Section 2, we present a derivation of our model and examine
some of its mathematical properties. Then, after a brief discussion of
the main assumptions, in Section 3, we prove our main result given by
the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Suppose that Assumptions 1–5 (see Section 3) hold. Then,
there exists a solution (u,m,$) of Problem 1 where u is a viscosity
solution of the first equation, Lipschitz and semiconcave in x, and dif-
ferentiable almost everywhere with respect to m, m ∈ C([0, T ],P), and
$ is Lipschitz continuous. Moreover, if  > 0 this solution is unique.
If  = 0 and Assumption 6 holds, then there is a unique solution
(u,m,$). Moreover, u is differentiable in x for every x, and uxx and
m are bounded.
Remark 1. In the case  > 0, the regularity of the solutions can be
improved using parabolic regularity.
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There are two main contributions of this paper. First, is the exis-
tence part of the preceding theorem which is proved in Section 4 using
a fixed-point argument. The key step is establishing an ordinary differ-
ential equation satisfied by the price, $. Using this equation, we obtain
Lipschitz bounds and then apply Schauder’s fixed-point theorem. To
prove the uniqueness part of the theorem, we use the monotonicity
method. This is achieved in Section 5 where we identify a new mono-
tonicity structure for mean-field games with constraints. Finally, we
discuss linear-quadratic models, that can be solved explicitly and com-
pare our model with the ones in [9]. Our results suggest that a price
determined by a supply versus demand condition may help stabilize
the oscilations of the price in particular in peak-demand situations.
2. A mean-field model for price formation
Here, we present the derivation of our price model. To simplify the
discussion, we examine the deterministic case,  = 0. We consider an
electricity grid connecting consumers to producers of energy. In our
model, each consumer has a storage device connected to the network,
for example, an electric car battery. We assume that all devices are
similar. Consumers trade electricity, charging the batteries when the
price is low and selling electricity to the market when the price is
high. A typical consumer has a battery whose charge at time t ∈
[0, T ] is x(t). This charge changes according to an energy flow rate,
the control variable selected by each consumer, which is a bounded
measurable function of α : [0, T ] → A, where A ⊂ R. Positive values
of α correspond to buying energy from the grid, and negative values
to selling to the grid. Accordingly, each consumer charge, x, changes
according to the dynamics:
x˙(t) = α(t).
Each consumer seeks to select α to minimize its cost, thus maximizing
profit. This cost is determined by a terminal cost and by the integral
of the running cost, `(α, x, t), where α(t) is the energy traded with the
electricity grid at time t, and ` depends in time through $(t), the spot
electricity price and is of the form
(3) `(α, x, t) = `0(α, x) +$(t)α(t).
In the preceding expression, the term $(t)α(t) is the instantaneous
cost corresponding to a charging current α(t). The current (or more
precisely power), α is measured in Watt, W, and the price, $, in
$W−1s−1. The function `0 accounts for non-linear effects of the current
5usage, for example, battery wear and tear, and for state preferences.
For example, we often take
(4) `0(α, x, t) =
c
2
α2(t) + V (x),
where c is a constant that accounts for the battery’s wear off, typically
given in $W−2s−1, and V (x) is a potential that takes into account
battery constraints and charge preferences. The singular case where
V (x) =
{
0 if 0 ≤ x ≤ 1
+∞ otherwise,
corresponds to the case where the battery charges satisfies 0 ≤ x ≤ 1.
To avoid singularities, we work with smooth potentials growing as x→
±∞; this behaviour correspond to a penalty on the battery charge
rather than a hard constraint. The nonlinear term, c
2
α2(t), models
battery wear and tear, which is large in high-current regimes. The
particular quadratic form in (4) simplifies the mathematical treatment.
However, it can be replaced by a convex function of α without any
major change in the discussion.
Each consumer minimizes the functional
(5) J(x, t, α) =
∫ T
t
`(α(s),x(t), t)ds+ u¯(x(T )),
where u¯ is the terminal cost and α ∈ At, where At is the set of bounded
measurable functions α : [t, T ]→ A.
The value function, u, is the infimum of J over all controls in At;
that is,
u(x, t) = inf
α∈At
J(x, t, α).
The Hamiltonian, H, for the preceding control problem is
H(x, p) = sup
a∈A
(−pa− `0(x, a)) .
For example, for `0 as in (4), we have
H(x, p) =
p2
2c
+ V (x).
From standard optimal control theory, u is a viscosity solution (see
[1]) of the Hamilton-Jacobi equation
(6)
{
−ut +H(x,$(t) + ux) = 0
u(x, T ) = u¯(x).
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For `0 as in (4), the prior equation becomes
−ut + 1
2c
(ux +$(t))
2 − V (x) = 0.
Finally, at points of differentiability of u, the optimal control is given
by
α∗(t) = −DpH(x,$(t) + ux(x(t), t)).
The associated transport equation is the adjoint of the linearized
Hamilton-Jacobi equation:
(7)
{
mt − (DpH(x, ux +$(t))m)x = 0,
m(x, 0) = m¯(x),
where m¯ is the initial distribution of the agents.
Taking `0 as in (4), the transport equation above becomes
mt − 1
c
(m($ + ux))x = 0.
Finally, we fix an energy production function Q(t) and require that
the production balances demand. Mathematically, this constraint cor-
responds to the identity∫
R
α∗(t)m(x, t)dx = Q(t);
that is,
(8)
∫
R
DpH(x, ux +$(t))m(x, t)dx = −Q(t).
This foregoing equality is the balance equation that forces the con-
sumed energy to match the production; this constraint determines the
price, $(t).
Combining (6), (7) and (8), we obtain (1) with  = 0 and the initial-
terminal conditions (2).
Now, we consider the case where the agents are subject to inde-
pendent random consumption. In this case  > 0. Let (Ω,F , P ) be a
probability space, where Ω is a sample space, F a σ-algebra on Ω and P
a probability measure. Let Wt be a Brownian motion on Ω and {Ft}t≥0
the associated filtration. In this case, we model the agent’s motion by
the stochastic differential equation
dx(t) = α(t)dt+
√
2dWt,
where the control, α, is a bounded progressively measurable real-valued
process. Following the previous steps and using standard arguments in
stochastic optimal control, we arrive again at (1).
73. Main Assumptions
We begin by discussing our main assumptions. First, we suppose
that H is the Legendre transform of a Lagrangian that is the sum of
an “energy flow cost”, `0(α), and a “charge preference cost”, V (x), as
follows:
Assumption 1. The Hamiltonian H is the Legendre transform of a
convex Lagrangian:
(9) H(x, p) = sup
α∈R
−pα− `0(α)− V (x),
where `0 ∈ C2(R) is a uniformly convex function and V ∈ C2(R) is
bounded from below.
Remark 2. The preceding hypothesis implies that the map p 7→ H(x, p)
is (strictly) convex. Moreover, the Hamiltonian in (9) can be written
as
(10) H(x, p) = H0(p)− V (x).
Thus,
D2xpH(x, p) = 0
for all x, p ∈ R.
To obtain a fixed point, we need several a priori estimates. These de-
pend on convexity and regularity properties of the data. The following
two assumptions lay out our requirements on the potential, V .
Assumption 2. The potential V in (9) and the terminal data u¯ are
globally Lipschitz.
Assumption 3. The potential V in (9) and the terminal data u¯ satisfy
|D2xxV | ≤ C, |D2xxu¯| ≤ C
for some positive constant C.
Next, we state an additional regularity for the initial-terminal data
that is used to prove second-order estimates.
Assumption 4. There exists a constant, C > 0, such that
|m¯xx|, |u¯xx| ≤ C.
The next two assumptions are used to ensure the solvability of the
demand-supply relation; that is, given Q that we can determine a suit-
able price.
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Assumption 5. There exists θ > 0 such that
D2ppH(x, p) > θ
for all x, p ∈ R. In addition, there exists C > 0 such that
|D3pppH| ≤ C.
Remark 3. Using (10) in Remark 2, the preceding assumption com-
bined with Assumption 1 implies that the function p 7→ DpH(p, x) is
strictly increasing and
lim
p→−∞
DpH(p, x) = −∞ lim
p→+∞
DpH(p, x) = +∞,
uniformly in x.
Remark 4. The uniform convexity of `0 in Assumption 1 gives an
upper bound for D2ppH. Thus, Assumption 1 and 5 imply
|D2ppH(x, p)| ≤ C
for all x, p ∈ R.
The following hypothesis gives regularity and uniqueness of solutions
in the first-order case.
Assumption 6. The potential, V , and the terminal cost, u¯, are convex.
4. Existence of a solution
Here, we establish the existence of a solution for the price model, (1),
using a fixed-point argument on $. In the following two propositions,
we examine the Hamilton-Jacobi equation
(11)
{
−ut +H(x,$ + ux) = uxx
u(x, T ) = u¯(x).
First, using Assumption 2, we prove the Lipschitz continuity of u. Next,
using Assumption 3, we obtain the semiconcavity of u. The proofs fol-
low standard arguments in optimal control theory. However, we present
them here to make it evident that the Lipschitz and semiconcavity con-
stants are uniform in $ and , both essential points in our argument.
Proposition 1. Consider the setting of Problem 1 and suppose that
Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Let u solve (11). Then, u(x, t) is locally
bounded and the map x 7→ u(x, t) is Lipschitz for 0 ≤ t ≤ T . Moreover,
the Lipschitz bound on u does not depend on $ nor on .
9Proof. The proof follows from the representation of u as a solution to a
stochastic control problem (or deterministic if  = 0). We fix a filtered
probability space (Ω,Ft, P ) that supports a one-dimensional Brownian
motion Wt. Then,
u(x, t) = inf E
[∫ T
t
`0(α) +$α + V (x)ds+ u¯(x(T ))
]
,
where the infimum is taken over bounded progressively measurable con-
trols α : [t, T ]→ R and x solves the stochastic differential equation
dx = αdt+
√
2dWt.
To prove local boundedness, we use the sub-optimal control α ≡ 0 to
get an upper bound, and the fact that V is bounded by below to obtain
the lower bound. We observe, however, that the lower bound depends
on bounds on $.
Then, we fix an optimal control, α∗, for (x, t); that is,
u(x, t) = E
[∫ T
t
`0(α
∗) +$α∗ + V (x∗)ds+ u¯(x(T )∗)
]
.
Then, for any h ∈ R, we have
u(x+ h, t) ≤ E
[∫ T
t
`0(α
∗) +$α∗ + V (x∗ + h)ds+ u¯(x(T )∗ + h)
]
,
from which the Lipschitz bound follows. Note that this Lipschitz bound
does not depend on $, only on T and on the Lipschitz estimates for V
and u¯. 
Proposition 2. Consider the setting of Problem 1 and suppose that
Assumptions 1 and 3 hold. Then, x 7→ u(x, t) is semiconcave with a
semiconcavity constant that does not depend on  nor on $.
Proof. As before, we fix an optimal control α∗ for (x, t); that is,
u(x, t) = E
[∫ T
t
`0(α
∗) +$α∗ + V (x∗)ds+ u¯(x(T )∗)
]
.
Then, for any h ∈ R, we have
u(x± h, t) ≤ E
[∫ T
t
`0(α
∗) +$α∗ + V (x∗ ± h)ds+ u¯(x(T )∗ ± h)
]
.
Therefore,
u(x+ h, t)− 2u(x, t) + u(x− h, t) ≤ Ch2.
Note that C does not depend on $, only on T and on the semiconcavity
estimates for V and u¯. 
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We have the following stability properties for the solutions of (11).
Proposition 3. Consider the setting of Problem 1 and suppose that
Assumptions 1–3 hold. Suppose that $n → $ uniformly on [0, T ], then
un → u locally uniformly and unx → ux almost everywhere.
Proof. The local uniform convergence of un follows from the stability
of viscosity solutions.
Because un is semiconcave and converges uniformly to u, unx → ux
almost everywhere. 
Now, we examine the Fokker-Planck equation.
(12)
{
mt − div(mDpH(x,$ + ux)) = ∆m,
m(x, 0) = m¯(x).
Let P denote the set of probability measures on R with finite second-
moment and endowed with the 1-Wasserstein distance.
Proposition 4. Consider the setting of Problem 1 with  > 0 and
suppose that Assumptions 1–2 hold. Then, (12) has a solution m ∈
C([0, T ],P). Moreover,
(13) d1(m(t),m(t+ h)) ≤ Ch1/2.
In addition, if Assumptions 3 and 4 hold, for any sequence $n → $
uniformly on [0, T ] and corresponing solutions un of (11) and mn of
(12), we have mn → m in C([0, T ],P1).
Proof. The existence of a solution in C([0, T ],P1) and the estimate
in (13) were proven in [6]. We note that, for  ≤ 0, the constant
C can be chosen to depend only on 0, on the problem data, and on
‖$‖L∞ . Thus, by the Ascoli-Arzela theorem, we have that mn → m
in C([0, T ],P1) for some m ∈ C([0, T ],P1). Because  > 0, mn → m
in, for example, L2(R × [0, T ]). Moreover, (12) has a unique solution.
Thus, it suffices to check that m solves (12). Because unx → ux, almost
everywhere, by semiconcavity, we have for any ψ ∈ C∞c (R× [0, T ])∫ T
0
∫
R
ψxDpH(x,$
n +unx)m
ndxdt→
∫ T
0
∫
R
ψxDpH(x,$+ux)mdxdt,
which gives that m is a weak solution of (12). 
Next, we prove an estimate for solutions of the system comprising
(11) and (12).
11
Proposition 5. Consider the setting of Problem 1 with  > 0 and
suppose that Assumptions 1 and 4 hold. Let (u,m) solve 11 and 12.
Then
(14)
∫ T
0
∫
R
D2ppHu
2
xxmdxdt ≤ C
Proof. We begin by differentiating (11) twice with respect to x, multi-
ply by m, and integrate by parts using (12). 
Remark 5. Formally, the previous estimates hold for  = 0. However,
the above proof requires that u is three times differentiable, which is not
usually the case. Nevertheless, the estimate in (14) is uniform in .
Finally, we consider the price-supply relation. Due to Remark 3 and
to the Lipschitz continuity of u given by Proposition 1, there exists a
unique ϑ0 such that
(15)
∫
R
DpH(x, ϑ0 + ux(x, 0))m¯dx = −Q(0).
Moreover, ϑ0 is bounded by a constant that depends only on the prob-
lem data.
Next, we differentiate∫
R
DpH(x,$ + ux)mdx = −Q(t)
in time to get the identity
(16) $˙
∫
R
D2ppHmdx+
∫
R
[
D2ppHuxtm+DpHmt
]
dx = −Q˙.
Differentiating (11) in x and substituting (12) both quantities on the
second term of the left hand side of (16), we get the following identity∫
R
D2ppHuxtm+DpHmt =
∫
R
D2ppH (−∆ux +DpHuxx +DxH)m
+
∫
R
DpH (∆m+ (mDpH)x) .
If Assumption 1 holds, we have by Remark 2 that D2xpH = 0. Hence,
(17)
∫
R
D2ppHuxtm+DpHmt =
∫
R
D2ppHDxHm+ D
3
pppHu
2
xxm.
Accordingly, we have the identity
(18) $˙
∫
R
D2ppHm = −Q˙−
∫
R
(
D2ppHDxH + D
3
pppHu
2
xx
)
m.
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Thus, given $, we solve (11) and (12) and define the following ordinary
differential equation
(19)
{
ϑ˙ =
−Q˙−∫RD2ppH(x,$+ux)DxH(x,$+ux)m+D3pppH(x,$+ux)u2xxm∫
RD
2
ppH(x,$+ux)m
ϑ(0) = ϑ0,
where ϑ0 is determined by (15). Then, (u,m,$) solves (1) if $ solves
(19).
Proposition 6. Consider the setting of Problem 1 with  > 0 and
suppose that Assumptions 1–5 hold. Suppose that $n → $ uniformly
in C([0, T ]). Let un, mn, and ϑn be the solutions to (11), (12), and 19
with $ replaced by $n. Then, ϑn converges to ϑ, uniformly in C([0, T ]),
where ϑ solves (19). Moreover, there exists a constant C that depends
only on the problem data but not on $ such that ‖ϑ‖W 1,∞([0,T ]) ≤ C.
Proof. The bound in W 1,∞([0, T ]) for ϑ is a consequence of Remark 3
and of the bounds in Assumption 5, in Remark 4, and in Proposition
5.
According to Proposition 3, the uniform convergence of $n → $
gives the convergence of unx → ux, almost everywhere. In addition,
Proposition 4 gives the convergence mn → m in C([0, T ],P). Because
D2ppH is bounded from below by Assumption 5, we have the conver-
gence of the right-hand side of (19) as follows, for any ψ ∈ C([0, T ]),∫ T
0
ψϑ˙nds→
∫ T
0
ψϑ˙ds.
Also, because the family ϑn is equicontinuous, any subsequence has a
further convergent subsequence that must converge to ϑ. Thus, ϑn →
ϑ, uniformly. 
With the preceding estimates, we can now prove a fixed-point result
and show the existence of a solution for  > 0.
Proof of Theorem 1 - part 1, existence for  ≥ 0. We begin by address-
ing the case  > 0. According to Proposition 6, the map $ → ϑ deter-
mined by (11), (12), and (19) is continuous in C([0, T ]), bounded, and
compact due to the W 1,∞ bound for $. Thus, by Schauder’s fixed-point
theorem, it has a fixed point.
Now, we examine the case  = 0. The key difficulty is the continuity
of the map $ → m in the case  = 0. To overcome this difficulty, we
use the vanishing viscosity method and the techniques in [10].
Let (u,m, $) solve (1) with  > 0. By the above, we have that$ is
uniformly bounded. Moreover, by Proposition 1, u is uniformly locally
bounded and Lipschitz. Therefore, as → 0, extracting a subsequence
13
if necessary, $ → $ and u → u where u is a viscosity solution of
(11).
Now, we introduce a phase-space measure µ as follows∫ T
0
∫
R2
ψ(x, p, t)dµ(x, p, t) =
∫ T
0
∫
R
ψ(x,$ + ux, t)m
dxdt
for all ψ ∈ Cb(R×R×[0, T ]). Because m ∈ C([0, T ],R) with a modulus
of continuity that is uniform in , as → 0, we have µ ⇀ µ; that is∫ T
0
∫
R2
ψdµ →
∫ T
0
∫
R2
ψdµ.
Moreover,due to the strict convexity of the Hamiltonian, arguing as in
[10], we have∫ T
0
∫
R2
ψt −DpH(x, p)Dxψdµ
=
∫
R
ψ(x, T )m(x, T )dx−
∫
R
ψ(x, 0)m¯(x)dx.
Next, we fix δ > 0 and consider a standard mollifier ηδ. We define
vδ = ηδ ∗ u.
We note that |D2vδ| ≤ C
δ2
. Then, using the uniform convexity of the
Hamiltonian, we get
−vδt + ηδ ∗ |ux − vδx|2 +H(x,$ + vδx) ≤ O(δ).
Therefore, w = vδ − u satisfies
− wt +DpH(x,$ + ux)wx − wxx
+ ηδ ∗ |ux − vδx|2 + γ|$ + vδx −$ − ux|2 ≤ O(δ) +O(

δ2
).
Integrating with respect to m, we conclude that∫ T
0
∫
R2
ηδ ∗|ux−vδx|2 +γ|$+vδx−p|2dµ ≤ O(δ)+O(

δ2
)+‖vδ−u‖L∞ .
Next, we let → 0, to get∫ T
0
∫
R2
ηδ ∗ |ux − vδx|2 + γ|$ + vδx − p|2dµ ≤ O(δ).
Finally, by letting δ → 0, we conclude that m-almost every point is
a point of approximate continuity of ux. Therefore, v
δ
x → ux almost
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everywhere. Hence, p = $ + ux µ-almost everywhere. Therefore, we
obtain ∫ T
0
∫
R2
(ψt −DpH(x,$ + ux)Dxψ) dµ
=
∫ T
0
∫
R
(ψt −DpH(x,$ + ux)Dxψ)mdxdt
=
∫
R
ψ(x, T )m(x, T )dx−
∫
R
ψ(x, 0)m¯(x)dx,
which gives that m solves (12) with  = 0.
Note also, that the preceding reasoning implies that u is differentiable
almost everywhere with respect to m. 
Finally, we record two additional results for (1). The first is an
energy estimate that is similar to other results in MFG.
Proposition 7. Let (u,m,$) be the solution of Problem 1 constructed
in Theorem 1. Suppose that there exists C > 0 such that
pDpH(x, p)−H(x, p) ≥ 1
C
H(x, p)− C.
Then, ∫ T
0
∫
R
H(x,$ + ux)(m0 +m)dxdt ≤ C.
Proof. We take the first equation in (1) and multiply it by m¯−m, and
the second equation by u − u¯. Adding the resulting expressions and
integrating by parts results in the desired estimate. 
The last result in this section concerns the regularity of the solutions
(11) in the case where both the potential and terminal data are convex.
Proposition 8. Suppose that  = 0, that Assumptions 1, 3, and 6
hold and let $ be a Lipschitz function. Then, the solution to (11) is
differentiable in x for every x ∈ R. Moreover, uxx is bounded.
Proof. Due to Assumption 6, we see that u(x, t) is convex in x by
direct inspection of the variational problem (5). By Proposition 2, u is
semiconcave in x. This gives the bound for uxx and the differentiability
of u in x. 
The preceding proposition implies the regularity of the solutions of
Problem 1, as stated in the next Corollary.
Corollary 1. Suppose that Assumptions 1–6 hold and that  = 0.
Then, there exists a solution (u,m,$) of Problem 1 with u differen-
tiable in x for every x and uxx bounded. Moreover, m is also bounded.
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Proof. The result follows by combining Proposition 8 with the fact that
the transport equation with locally Lipschitz coefficients has a unique
weak solution in L∞. 
Proof of Theorem 1 - part 2, additional regularity for  = 0. Additional
regularity for the case where Assumption 6 holds and  = 0 follows from
Corollary 1. 
5. Uniqueness
Now, we examine the uniqueness of solutions. We begin by observing
that (1) can be written as a monotone operator. As a consequence, we
obtain a uniqueness result.
We set
ΩT = R× [0, T ],
and
D =(C∞(ΩT ) ∩ C([0, T ],P))× (C∞(ΩT ) ∩W 1,∞(ΩT ))× C∞([0, T ]),
D+ ={(m,u,$) ∈ D s.t. m > 0},
Db ={(m,u,$) ∈ D s.t. m(x, 0) = m¯(x), u(x, T ) = u¯(x)},
Db+ =D
b ∩D+,
Then, we define A : Db+ → D as
A
mu
$
 =A1
mu
$
+ A2
mu
$

=
 ut + uxxmt − mxx
0
+
 −H(x,Du+$)−div(mDpH(x,$ + ux))∫
Ω
mDpH(x,$ + ux)dx+Q(t)
 .
(20)
Furthermore, for w = (m,u,$), w˜ = (m˜, u˜, $˜) ∈ D, we set
〈w, w˜〉 =
∫
ΩT
(mm˜+ uu˜) dxdt+
T∫
0
$$˜dt.
Then, A is a monotone operator if
〈A[w]− A[w˜], w − w˜〉 ≥ 0 for all w, w˜ ∈ Db+.
Under the convexity of the map p 7→ H(x, p), A is a monotone
operator.
Proposition 9. Suppose the map p 7→ H(x, p) is convex. Then A is a
monotone operator.
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Proof. Let w = (m,u,$), w˜ = (m˜, u˜, $˜) ∈ Db+. Then, integrating by
parts, we obtain
〈A1[w]− A1[w˜], w − w˜〉
=
∫
ΩT
((u− u˜)t + ∆(u− u˜))(m− m˜) +
∫
ΩT
((m− m˜)t − ∆(m− m˜))(u− u˜)
=0,
because u− u˜ and m− m˜ vanish at t = 0 and t = T . Furthermore, we
have that
〈A2[w]− A2[w˜], w − w˜〉
=−
∫
ΩT
(H(x, ux +$)−H(x, u˜x + $˜))(m− m˜)dxdt
−
∫
ΩT
div(mDpH(x, ux +$)− m˜DpH(x, u˜x + $˜))(u− u˜)dxdt
+
T∫
0
($ − $˜)
∫
R
(mDpH(x, ux +$)− m˜DpH(x, u˜x + $˜))dxdt
=−
∫
ΩT
(H(x, ux +$)−H(x, u˜x + $˜))(m− m˜)dxdt
+
∫
ΩT
(mDpH(x, ux +$)− m˜DpH(x, u˜x + $˜))(ux − u˜x)dxdt
+
∫
ΩT
(mDpH(x, ux +$)− m˜DpH(x, u˜x + $˜))($ − $˜)dxdt
=
∫
ΩT
m
(
H(x, u˜x + $˜)−H(x, ux +$)− (u˜x + $˜ − ux −$)DpH(x, ux +$)
)
dxdt
+
∫
ΩT
m˜
(
H(x, ux +$)−H(x, u˜x + $˜)− (ux +$ − u˜x − $˜)DpH(x, u˜x + $˜)
)
dxdt
≥0,
by the convexity of p 7→ H(x, p). Combining the previous inequalities,
we conclude that
〈A[w]− A[w˜], w − w˜〉
=〈A1[w]− A1[w˜], w − w˜〉+ 〈A2[w]− A2[w˜], w − w˜〉 ≥ 0.
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
Now, we discuss the last part of the proof of Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1 - part 3, uniqueness. Let (m,u,$) and (m˜, u˜, $˜)
solve Problem 1. If  > 0 or if  = 0 and Assumption 6 holds, we have m
and m˜ are absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure.
Thus, the computations in the proof of Proposition 9, combined with
the uniform convexity of H in Assumption 5, give∫ T
0
∫
R
|$ + ux − $˜ − u˜x|2(m˜+m) = 0.
Therefore, $ + ux = $˜ + u˜x almost everywhere. In both cases, this
implies
ut = u˜t,
almost everywhere and, thus, u = u˜. Finally, the uniqueness of the
Fokker-Planck equation, for  > 0 or for the transport equation, when
 = 0 and Assumption 6 holds, give m = m˜. 
6. Linear-quadratic models
Here, we consider linear-quadratic price models. First, we examine
the case without a potential and determine an explicit solution. Then,
we introduce a quadratic potential that accounts for charge level pref-
erences. In this last case, we describe a procedure to solve the problem,
up to the inversion of Laplace transforms and solution of ordinary dif-
ferential equations.
6.1. State-independent quadratic cost. First, we consider the qua-
dratic state-independent cost
(21) `(t, α) =
c
2
α2 + α$(t),
where c is a constant that accounts for the usage-depreciation of the
battery. The corresponding MFG is
−ut + ($(t)+ux)22c = 0
mt − 1c (m($(t) + ux))x = 0
1
c
∫
R($(t) + ux)mdx = −Q(t).
(22)
The stored energy by each agent follows optimal trajectories that solve
the Euler Lagrange equation:
cx¨+ $˙ = 0.
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Integrating the previous equation in time, we get
(23) x˙(t) =
1
c
(θ −$(t)) ,
where θ is time independent. Next, by differentiating the Hamilton-
Jacobi equation, we get
−(ux)t + (ux +$)uxx
c
= 0.
Using the previous equation, taking into account the transport equa-
tion, and integrating by parts, we have
d
dt
∫
R
uxmdx =
∫
R
uxtm+ uxmt =
∫
R
uxtm+
1
c
ux (m($ + ux))x
=
1
c
∫
R
($ + ux)uxxm− uxxm($ + ux)dx = 0,
assuming that m has fast enough decay at infinity.
Thus, the supply vs demand balance condition becomes
Q(t) = −1
c
∫
R
(ux +$)mdx =
1
c
(Θ−$) ,
where
(24) Θ = −
∫
R
uxmdx
is constant. From the above, we obtain the following linear price-supply
relation
(25) $ = Θ− cQ(t).
Integrating (23) in time and taking into account the linear price-supply
relation (25), we gather
(26)
x(T ) = x(t) +
1
c
∫ T
t
(θ −$(s))ds = x+ T − t
c
(θ −Θ) +
∫ T
t
Q(s)ds.
Accordingly, u is given by the optimization problem
u(x, t) = inf
θ
∫ T
t
[
(θ −Θ + cQ(s))2
2c
+
1
c
(θ −Θ + cQ(s))(Θ− cQ(s))
]
ds
+ u¯
(
x+
(θ −Θ)
c
(T − t) +K(t)
)
,
where
K(t) =
∫ T
t
Q(s)ds.
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By setting µ = θ −Θ, we get
u(x, t) = inf
µ
∫ T
t
[
(µ+ cQ(s))2
2c
+
1
c
(µ+ cQ(s))(Θ− cQ(s))
]
ds
+ u¯
(
x+
µ
c
(T − t) +K(t)
)
.
Thus, given Θ, we determine a function, uΘ, solving the preceding
minimization problem. For that, we expand the integral to get
uΘ(x, t) = inf
µ
[
T − t
2c
µ2 +
1
c
(T − t)Θµ+
∫ T
t
(
Θ− cQ(s)
2
)
Q(s)ds
+u¯
(
x+
µ
c
(T − t) +K(t)
)]
.
Next, we take the derivative of the right-hand side of the prior identity
with respect to µ and obtain the relation
(27) µ+ u¯x (x(T )) = −Θ.
If u¯ is a convex function, the preceding equation has a unique solution,
µ(Θ) for each given Θ. Thus, given Θ, we obtain a solution, uΘ for the
Hamilton-Jacobi equation. Finally, we use the resulting expression for
uΘ in (24) at t = 0 to obtain the following condition for Θ:
(28) Θ = −
∫
R
uΘx (x, 0)m0(x)dx.
Solving the preceding equation, we obtain Θ and hence $ using the
price-supply relation, (25).
As an example, we consider the terminal cost
u¯(y) =
γ
2
(y − ζ)2 .
Solving(27), we obtain
(29) µ = −γ(K(t) + x− ζ) + Θ
1 + γ T−t
c
.
Accordingly, we have
uΘ(x, t) =
γ(K(t) + x− ζ)2 + (t−T )
c
Θ(2γ(K(t) + x− ζ) + Θ)
2
(
1 + γ T−t
c
)
+ ΘK(t)− c
∫ T
t
Q2(s)
2
ds.
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Therefore,
ux(x, t) = γ
K(t) + x− ζ − (T−t)
c
Θ
1 + γ T−t
c
Using the previous expression for t = 0 in (28), we obtain the following
equation for Θ
Θ = −γK(0) + x¯− ζ −
T
c
Θ
1 + γ T
c
where
x¯ =
∫
R
xm0dx.
Thus,
(30) Θ = −γ(K(0) + x¯− ζ).
Therefore, using (25), we obtain
$ = −γ(K(0) + x¯− ζ)− cQ.
Finally, we use the above results and conclude that each agent dynamics
is {
x˙ = (x¯−x)γ
1+T
c
γ
+Q
x(0) = x.
In alternative, using
x˙(t) = −$ + ux(x(t), t)
c
we have
(31)
{
x˙(t) = (x¯(t)−x(t))γ
1+T−t
c
γ
+Q
x(0) = x,
where
x¯(t) =
∫
R
xm(x, t)dx.
Averaging (31) with respect to m, we obtain
(32) ˙¯x(t) = Q(t),
which is simply the conservation of energy. Thus, the trajectory of an
individual agent can be computed by combining (31) with (32) into the
system {
x˙(t) = (x¯(t)−x(t))γ
1+T−t
c
γ
+Q(t)
˙¯x(t) = Q.
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The previous system is a closed system of ordinary differential equa-
tions that only involves Q and the parameters of the problem. Sur-
prisingly, it also does not depend on ζ. This is due to the fact that the
average of the position of the agents is determined by Q. Hence, the
only way agents can improve their value function is by getting close to
each other. This is seen in the mean-reverting structure in (31).
6.2. Quadratic cost with potential. Now, we consider a running
cost with a quadratic potential. This potential penalizes the agents
when the charge or stored energy deviates too much from a set point,
κ. This penalty has the form of η
2
(x − κ)2, where η measures the
strength of the penalty. Thus, we have
`(t, x, α) = c
α2
2
+ α$(t) +
η
2
(x− κ)2.
The corresponding MFG is
−ut + ($(t)+ux)22c − η2(x− κ)2 = 0
mt − 1c (m($(t) + ux))x = 0
1
c
∫
($(t) + ux)m = −Q(t).
(33)
Differentiating the Hamilton-Jacobi equation, we conclude that
−(ux)t + (ux +$)uxx − η(x− κ) = 0.
We define the following quantities
Π =
∫
R
uxm and Ξ =
∫
R
xm.
Taking the time derivative on the first quantity and using the transport
equation, we get
Π˙ =
∫
R
uxtm+ uxmt
=
∫
R
($ + ux)uxxm− η
∫
R
(x− κ)m+
∫
R
ux(m($ + ux))x
=
∫
R
($ + ux)uxxm−
∫
R
uxxm($ + ux)− η
∫
R
(x− κ)m.
Simplifying the preceding expression, we obtain
Π˙ = −η(Ξ− κ).
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Next, we take the transport equation, multiply it by x, and integrate
by parts, to get
Ξ˙ =
d
dt
∫
R
xm =
∫
R
xmt =
∫
R
x (m($ + ux))x
= −
∫
R
m($ + ux) + [x(m($ + ux)|Ω
= −$ −
∫
R
uxm.
Thus, we conclude that
Ξ˙ = −$ − Π.
Therefore, we obtain the following averaged dynamics{
Ξ˙ = −$ − Π
Π˙ = −η(Ξ− κ).
Taking the time derivative of the second equation and using the first
equation, we get
Π¨− ηΠ = η($ + κ).
The preceding equation has the following solution
Π = −κ+ e√ηtC1 + e−
√
ηtC2 +
√
η
2
∫ t
0
(
e
√
η(t−s) − e−√η(t−s))$(s)ds.
Moreover, at t = 0, we have
Π˙(0) = −η(Ξ(0)− κ) = −η(x¯− κ),
where
x¯ =
∫
R
xm¯.
Thus, we need an additional constant to determine Π(0). Given this
constant, from the constraint equation in (33), we get
$Π(0)(t) = −Π−Q(t)
= fΠ(0)(t)−
√
η
2
∫ t
0
(
e
√
η(t−s) − e−√η(t−s))$Π(0)(s)ds,
where fΠ(0)(t) = κ − e
√
ηtC1 − e−
√
ηtC2 − Q(t), and C1 and C2 are
determined by the value of Π˙(0) and by the unknown value Π(0).
The preceding equation is a Volterra integral equation of the second
kind with a separable kernel. In principle, we can solve this equation
using Laplace’s transform. The previous equation is of the form
(34) $Π(0)(t) = fΠ(0)(t)− λ(k ∗$Π(0))(t),
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where
k(t) = −
√
η
2
(
e
√
ηt − e−√ηt)
and (k ∗$) = ∫ t
0
k(t−s)$(s)ds denotes the convolution product of the
kernel k with $.
Let L denote the Laplace transform. Because L{(k ∗ $)(t)} =
L{k(t)}L{$(t)}, applying the Laplace transform to (34) yields
L{$(t)} = L{fΠ(0)(t)}+ λL{k(t)}L{$(t)}.
Simplifying the above equation, we obtain
$Π(0)(t) = L−1
{ L{fΠ(0)(t)}
1− λL{k(t)}
}
,
where L−1 is the inverse Laplace transform.
Finally, we take the resulting expression for $Π(0) into the Hamilton-
Jacobi equation, solve it and obtain a function uΠ(0)(x, t). Then, the
value Π0 is determined implicitly by the equation
(35) Π(0) =
∫
R
(uΠ(0))x(x, 0)m0dx.
In the case of quadratic terminal data,
u(x, T ) =
γ
2
(x− ζ)2,
we can reduce the solution of the Hamilton-Jacobi equation into solving
ordinary differential equations. For that, we look for a solution
u(x, t) = θ0(t) + θ1(t)x+ θ2(t)x
2
satisfying
u(x, T ) =
γ
2
(x− ζ)2 = θ0(T ) + θ1(T )x+ θ2(T )x2.
Then, the first equation in (33) becomes
−(θ˙0 + θ˙1(t)x+ θ˙2(t)x2) + ($(t) + θ1(t) + 2θ2(t)x)
2
2c
− η
2
(x− κ)2 = 0.
Thus, by matching powers of x, we obtain differential equations for θi,
0 ≤ i ≤ 2. The resulting expression can be used in (35) to obtain the
solution.
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7. Real Data
In this section, we use real data of daily energy consumption in the
UK, during a twenty-four hour period. The data is available online
at https://www.nationalgrid.com/uk/. In Figure 1, we plot the
power supply oscillationQ (which is simply the negative of the demand)
normalized to have mean zero over 24 hours.
4 8 12 16 20 24
time (hours)
-5000
0
5000
Power supply oscillation, Q(t) (in MW)
Fig. 1. Normalized electricity production Q.
We compare our price-formation model with the MFG model pre-
sented in [9]. In that model, the energy price is a function of the
aggregate consumption. In that case, the price is not determined by
a supply vs demand condition and, thus, there may be an energy im-
balance. Here, we consider the state-independent quadratic cost model
from Section 6.1. In our model, the price depends only on the constant
that accounts for battery’s wear and tear. This constant can be empir-
ically estimated, but, here, we calibrate our model against the model
in [9] using a least squares approach. Let ϑ be the priced computed
in [9]. According to (25), the price given is $c,Θ = Θ− cQ. Thus, we
estimate the value of c, by solving the minimization problem
(36) min
c,Θ∈R
‖$c,Θ − ϑ‖22 = min
c,Θ∈R
‖Θ− cQ− ϑ‖22,
and, using N = 106 agents, we obtained c = 0.00172$(kW)−2h−1.
The price given by our model is plotted in Figure 2. We predict
smaller peak oscillations and thus, our methods may help stabilize the
market.
8. Conclusions and extensions
Here, we described a model for price formation in electricity markets,
proved the well-posedness of the problem, and developed methods to
compute the solutions. Our model has a minimal number of features
and fits well real data. In addition, our model may have stabilizing
properties of the price at peak consumption.
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Fig. 2. Evolution of electricity price during a twenty-
four hour period. In green, we plot the energy’s price
when no batteries are connected to the grid. In blue, we
plot the price with batteries connected to the grid and
the price is given by the model in [9]. In yellow, we plot
the price corresponding to our model.
Several extensions of our model are of interest. First, we can consider
the case where the supply Q($, t) depends on price. Provided the
supply increases with the price, which is a natural assumption from
the economic point of view, the solvability conditions are similar. In
particular, (18) becomes
$˙
[
∂Q
∂$
+
∫
R
D2ppHmdx
]
= −∂Q
∂t
−
∫
R
[
D2ppHDxHm+ D
3
pppHu
2
xxm
]
dx.
Thus, we obtain similar bounds for $˙ if ∂Q
∂$
≥ 0. Therefore, the ex-
istence theory follows a similar argument. Moreover, if ∂Q
∂$
≥ 0, the
operator A in section (5) is monotone and, therefore, uniqueness of
solution holds.
In real applications, Q may depend on delayed prices. While this
does not fit directly into our framework, we can consider a Taylor
expansion:
Q($(t− τ), t) 'Q($(t), t)− τ ∂Q($(t), t)
∂$
$˙(t)
+
τ 2
2
[
∂Q($(t), t)
∂$
$¨ +
∂2Q($(t), t)
∂$2
$˙2(t)
]
+ . . .
Thus, it is natural to look at the case where Q depends on the price
and its derivatives.
Finally, a natural extension is the case where Q has random fluctu-
ations. This is particularly relevant if the energy production is subject
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to unpredictable changes - this is the case of wind energy. For the case
where Q is random, we need to use the master equation as in [25].
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